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Abstract 
 
The practical realization of European Union (EU) rights and obligations depends to a considerable 
extent on how national public authorities apply EU legislation in their daily work. A growing 
number of EU compliance studies have probed the transposition of EU law and discussed the 
importance and shortcomings of the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) and national courts as central and decentralised enforcers. However, the practical 
application of EU rights and obligations remains rather unexplored. Drawing on survey data 
covering EU-27 and three EEA states participating in Solvit, an internal market problem-solving 
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network, this paper investigates the role of transgovernmental networks in enforcing and managing 
the daily application of EU legislation by national authorities. We show that informal conflict 
resolution has become an important and effective tool for addressing misapplication of EU law. 
Anchored in national public administrations yet working under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (namely 
the Commission) transgovermental networks are in fact able to improve the compliance of domestic 
authorities.  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to add to the discussion of new governance mechanisms to address and solve 
problems of misapplication of EU law. It draws on theory on transgovernmental networks from 
international relations studies and applies these to examine the practical application of, and 
compliance with, EU law.  
Compliance with international agreements continues to be a challenge to international 
politics, and has increasingly received scholarly attention, not least within European Union studies. 
The ‘governance dilemma’ of a globalised world is still pertinent and international organizations 
continue to lack suitable instruments to monitor and oversee that states fulfil their international 
obligations.
3
 If the agreements of international organizations are not complied with they are of little 
value. Therefore to inquire into states’ compliance with the international agreements they have 
ratified, is to inquire into the reach, regulatory strength and de facto impact of that international 
organization. The European Union is a prominent example of how important compliance is to the 
legitimacy and cohesiveness of an international organization. How to improve compliance and the 
                                                 
3
 B. Eberlein and A.L. Newman, 'Escaping the Intergovernmental Governance Dilemma? Incorporated 
Transgovrnmental Networks in the European Union' (2008) Governance 25. 
3 
 
practical application of EU rules is generally high on the European agenda. Scholarly research on 
international and regional integration within political science and law has advanced our knowledge 
considerably during the last decades. A growing number of studies have examined the extent to 
which EU Member States transpose binding decisions into national law on time and correctly as 
well as what may explain variation in transposition between the Member States.
4
 However we still 
know relatively little about compliance beyond the transposition of EU law.
5
  For example, which 
instruments improve application of EU rules in practice? What compliance problems arise after 
transposition of EU law has taken place, i.e. once an EU regulation applies in practice, and how 
common are these problems? Have new modes of governance developed to handle misapplication 
on the ground?    
The EU constitutes the most legalized international organization in the world, able to 
judicially address and sanction non-compliance, and is exceedingly effective in doing so compared 
to other international organizations.
6
 However although the importance of management tools to 
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improve compliance has been emphasized in international relations and European studies,
7
 
scholarly work tends to focus on central and decentralised enforcement mechanisms, i.e. the 
infringement procedures monitored by the European Commission and private litigants and national 
courts bringing preliminary references to the European Court of Justice and.
8
 We know relatively 
little about concrete management instruments, how they work, how they have developed and 
whether they are effective means to improve compliance. 
This paper examines the role of transgovernmental networks (TGNs) in monitoring and 
overseeing the practical application of EU law, focusing on the SOLVIT network. 
Transgovernmental networks differ from transnational networks by having government 
representatives as the actors instead of independent experts or representatives from interest 
organisations which are main actors transnational networks.
9
 The chapter enquires into the modus 
operandi of TGNs and the effectiveness of this new governance tool as mode of enforcing EU law. 
It finds that TGNs have developed as important and effective monitoring instruments for the 
practical application of EU law, operating mainly in line with management logics. We define 
effective enforcement as the problem-solving capacity and resolution speed of the network in 
question. Problem-solving capacity concerns the ability of the network to identify, mediate and 
solve problems of misapplied EU law. Resolution speed concerns the time used to solve such 
problems. These dual elements of effective enforcement thus defines effectiveness both in terms of 
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the instrumental ability to enforce EU law as well as the timely aspect of it. The latter part of the 
definition is often disregarded, but is highly important if EU law is to work on the ground, for 
citizens and enterprises.    
 
1. Effectuating European Integration: the state of art in political science studies 
By virtue of extensive EU transposition and compliance studies, political scientists  have developed 
a fairly good grasp of whether EU directives are transposed on time, but we have little scholarly 
insight into ‘the EU law in action’, i.e. the practical application of EU rules.10 Furthermore, our 
knowledge remains limited in relation to how national public administrations respond to and 
assume the obligations which make EU law work at all levels of society. Does the application of EU 
law function in practice when domestic authorities at the national, regional and local levels are to 
administer in accordance with supranational rules?  
Compared to other international organisations, the EU is seen to have developed fairly 
efficient enforcement procedures through which non-compliance is detected and pursued
11
. As a 
result, non-compliance is seen by some to be a temporal phenomenon.
12
 Concerning the 
supranational enforcement practices, the vital role played by the European Commission and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) towards ensuring state compliance stand clear.
13
 
The role played by interest groups and national courts has also been emphasised as a key 
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decentralised means pushing for national compliance.
14
 Tallberg has argued that this unique 
combination of central and decentralised enforcement mechanisms makes the EU very ‘effective in 
combating detected violations’.15  
However, the extent to which this model of ‘dual enforcement’ is able to detect and 
resolve the full scope of EU law violation is still open to critical examination. Central enforcement 
mechanisms have their shortcomings.  The Commission lacks the resources and capacity to uncover 
and legally pursue the whole EU-wide spectre of non-compliance.
16
 Furthermore, the decentralized 
strategies whereby non-compliance is challenged in national courts are no ‘panacea’ for the 
enforcement of EU law, as individuals acting as litigants often lack the necessary resources and 
time to carry out legal proceedings.
17
  Finally, the EU is ‘currently in a state of turmoil’18 where 
both economic and legitimacy crises are likely to affect Member States’ willingness and ability to 
comply with EU decisions.
19
 The ability to enforce its rules and regulation is closely linked to the 
EU’s credibility as a political system and as a system founded on the rule of law. According to 
                                                 
14
  Alter and Vargas (n 8); Alter (n 8); L.J. Conant ‘Justice contained: Law and politics in the European Union’ (Cornell 
University Press 2002); Tallberg (n 6); Tallberg (n 13); M. Wind, D.S. Martinsen and G.P. Rotger 'The Uneven Legal 
Push for Europe. Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe' (2009) European Union Politics 63; R. 
Slepcevic ‘The judicial enforcement of EU law through national courts: possibilities and limits’ (2009) 16(3) Journal of 
European Public Policy 378. 
15
 Tallberg (n 6) 610. 
16
 Börzel, Hofmann, Panke and Sprungk (n 4) 1374; G. Falkner and M. Hartlapp ‘Problems of operationalization and 
data in EU compliance research’ (2009) 10(2) European Union Politics 281, and see Chapter 2 of this volume. 
17
 See Chapter 1 of this volume and Slepcevic (n 14) 391. 
18
 G. Falkner ‘The JCMS Annual Review Lecture. Is the European Union Losing Its Credibility?’ (2013) 51 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 13.  
19
 Although as Commission’s statistics on centralized enforcement do not seem to betray any worsening compliance 
picture so far. 
7 
 
Falkner, the EU is currently in need of restoring societal confidence that its commitments are ‘real 
and binding’.20   
 
1.1 The practical application of EU law 
We still know remarkably little about the practical application of EU rules, that is, how the rules 
work in practice and are applied ‘out there’ in order to regulate the daily lives and doings of citizens 
and enterprises. With some exceptions,
21
 most studies dealing with implementation have examined 
the formal stage of transposition, also termed legal or judicial implementation, in which a directive 
is transposed into national legislation.
22
 In these analyses, infringement proceedings and 
transposition records generally constitute the focus of research upon which conclusions are made on 
whether Member States are EU compliers.
23
 However, the same scholars point out that 
infringements may not offer a representative sample of all of the violations of supranational 
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obligations, but rather only the ‘tip of the non-compliance iceberg’.24 We are thus left to assume 
that there are many other incidents of misapplication beyond formal transposition than those 
detected and pursued by means of infringement proceedings.  
Whereas judicial implementation is a process steered mainly by member state 
governments and the core executive, correct practical application depends on the extent to which 
national public authorities at different levels of governance understand and act in accordance with 
the EU rule of law. Correct practical implementation also depends on the extent to which the 
correctness of implementation is controlled. As noted by Falkner, there is no reason to think that EU 
law is generally obeyed. An effective law enforcement regime depends on ‘basic pillars to work 
adequately: public administrations, labour inspectorates, court systems, media and civil society 
institutions that could act as whistleblowers and intermediate potential problems.’25  
 In order to address problems arising in the practical application of EU law, the EU has 
supplemented its coercive instruments of enforcement with cooperative means of management.
26
 
Side by side with the deterrent message of enforcement by sanctions, Member States are monitored 
by means of a more informal, softer managerial approach. This management approach implies 
dialogue and mutual trust.
27
 The management approach recognises that sometimes non-compliance 
is not the mere result of deliberate behaviour, that is, the member state neglecting or ignoring to 
fulfil its EU obligations in a calculated manner. Instead, non-compliance can be caused by 
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ambiguous treaty language, complex secondary legislation, as well as a lack of administrative 
capacity and/or transparency. Different solutions are therefore required: 
 
‘…the improvement of dispute resolution procedures goes to the problem of ambiguity; 
technical and financial assistance may help cure the capacity deficit; and transparency will 
make it likelier that, over time, national policy decisions are brought increasingly into line with 
agreed international standards’.28  
 
The management view introduces an important shift in the EU theoretical and empirical approach to 
compliance. It departs from a ’command and control’ understanding of which instruments best 
solve problems of the misapplication of law. In order to improve compliance, the non-complier 
should be assisted to solve the problems – instead of sued and sanctioned. Dispute settlements by 
means of management are based on dialogue, trust, involvement, capacity building and 
transparency.
29
 Problem solving involves mediation of positions between all the involved parties so 
that they come to terms with the mutual solution identified. In this way, the process of problem 
solving aims to find a solution that appeases and works for all the involved parties. The dispute 
solving mechanisms differ from legal proceedings in court where the court concludes on the 
‘correct’ legal interpretation, which may ultimately please neither parties. Transgovernmental 
networks constitute such forums for problem-solving, beyond traditional central and decentralized 
enforcement mechanisms.  
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2. Transgovernmental networks as new means of executive governance    
Political scientists recognize that transgovernmental networks have emerged as a constitutive part of 
European integration.
30
 Whilst the importance of transgovernmental cooperation has long been 
accepted within the study of international relations, the scope and the policy areas covered by TGNs 
with the EU’s infrastructure are currently found to have taken on  “completely new dimensions”.31 
A transgovernmental network consists of regular and purposive relations between government 
actors, dealing with cross-border policies and problems. The government actors represent the state 
but operate at levels below the heads of states.  They act as sector-specific experts who together 
develop shared, standard operating practices, by means of regular and purposive action, focusing on 
sector specific problems such as environmental sustainability, human rights, data protection, 
electricity,  justice and home affairs.
32
 Civil servants or ‘regulators’ are key actors in such networks, 
serving as the new diplomats of global governance.
33
 When they interact with their foreign peers, 
they bring with them their domestic expertise and views, but are forced to exchange these views and 
present solutions on collective problems arising from transgovernmentalism in practice.  
TGNs serve as fora of sharing information, building capacity, developing experience 
and learning between the actors involved and thus rely on management, rather than enforcement, 
                                                 
30
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logics in the way they monitor disputes.
 34
 One of the concrete impacts that TGNs can have is to 
improve compliance with international rules.
35
 Such transgovernmental enforcement networks are 
found to play a crucial role in the effectuation of international rules as they lower the transaction 
costs of enforcement. Although TGNs are accepted as an important and expanding form of 
governance, able to provide a fast and flexible alternative to the formal procedures of international 
organisations,
36
 we know little about their actual modus operandi, less about their effect and what 
may condition effectiveness. Their effectiveness is often claimed, but not tested or systematically 
explored.
37
 Can informal problem-solving mechanisms effectively monitor and oversee compliance 
problems of supranational governance? Can they monitor the practical application of EU law, and if 
so, do all units in a network function equally effectively? What may explain variations in 
effectiveness  across the network? These questions will be examined below.  
 
3. The study of the Solvit network: Data, method and scope 
The transgovernmental network of SOLVIT is examined in this chapter. The Solvit network 
monitors the practical application of internal market law within the EU Member States as well as 
the three Member States of the European Economic Area (EEA); Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland. 
Solvit was established in 2001
38
 and handles complaints from citizens and businesses concerning 
the application of European law in cross-border cases. Conflicts are resolved via a dialogue between 
                                                 
34
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national Solvit centres, domestic authorities complained about and in some instances also the 
Commission. The network today processes a notable amount of cases and claim a high success rate 
in resolving disputes.
39
 Although examining the single case of the internal market, Solvit mirrors a 
more general tendency in the European Union where regulatory networks are established to carry 
out key functions of executive governance.
40
 Furthermore, the problems arising in practice when 
internal market law is to be applied essentially mirrors the challenges confronting national 
authorities, businesses and citizens when practising the rules of global governance.  
In order to examine the work-mode and effectiveness of a transgovernmental network, 
we conducted an online survey enquiring into the characteristics and modes of the Solvit network. 
The survey was sent to all 30 national Solvit centres, i.e. EU-27 as well as Iceland, Norway and 
Liechtenstein as part of the European Economic Area (EEA).
41
 The survey was carried out in the 
first half of 2011. It was presented as solely academic in its purpose. Most of the centres responded 
to our first enquiry. The centres that did not fill out the survey were subsequently contacted by e-
mail and telephone. Over time, all of the centres answered and we thus managed to obtain a full 
                                                 
39
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response rate. In addition, data was provided to us by the European Commission in summer 2012 
on the resolution rates of the individual Solvit centres, extracted from the Commission’s database. 
This data is not publicly available but was provided by the Commission on our request on the basis 
of previously established contact. 
The survey themes and questions were put together following close studies of the 
publicly available documents on Solvit together with explorative interviews with the national 
centres in the United Kingdom and Denmark. The explorative interviews were used to test our 
initial theoretical ideas and ensure that the questions would address the key dynamics of the 
network and appear understandable within its context.
42
 The British and Danish Solvit centres also 
agreed to read through a draft of the survey and provided a final set of comments on our draft. 
Finally, we engaged in informal dialogue with the Commission on our project and questionnaire. 
We used this approach to ensure as fully as possible that the questions would be intelligible to the 
network participants. Towards the end of the survey, we also asked the participants if we might 
return with follow-up questions.  
The survey consisted of 30 questions. The centres could mainly respond to them on a 
scale such as increased/decreased or strongly agree/strongly disagree. We thereby attempted to 
obtain answers that would be more easily summarised across all participating states. The key 
questions also included a text box for additional comments.  
Our enquiry addressed three overall themes. The first was the resources and relations 
of the network. Here, we explored the amount of contact with other centres, other parts of the 
national public administration, the Commission and changes in the level of institutionalisation over 
time. The second was the case management process in practice. This section explored the 
efficiency of the network, the role and monitoring of the Commission and reasons for 
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misapplication. The third and final section examined the values of the network. Here, we asked 
questions concerning the network’s source of legitimacy, the character of an ideal case solution and 
their orientation towards either national or European interests. The specific survey questions asked 
are stated alongside each illustration reporting on our findings. Apart from the survey data and 
explorative interviews, the analysis draws on relevant supplementary material, such as the 
Commission’s annual reports on the network.  
 
3.1. Informal dispute settlements in the EU: Presenting the Solvit network 
The European Commission officially proposed the establishment of the Solvit network in late 2001, 
enabling citizens or enterprises to submit complaints to nationally based centres concerning the 
misapplication of internal market rules.
43
 The Council of Ministers endorsed the Commission’s 
proposal shortly afterwards, and the network started handling cases in 2002.
44;
 The executive 
summary of the Commission’s initial communication highlighted the purposes and means of the 
network. It was to provide effective problem-solving in relation to cross border disputes in the 
sphere of the internal market by means of administrative dispute settlements, enhanced transparency 
and peer-pressure. Specifically, the envisioned network was to be based on an online database 
where examined disputes could be registered and solutions reported on. Furthermore, it was to 
undertake preventive actions by seeking to remove the causes of recurring problems as well as to 
promote itself and target information to citizens and business.
45
 The Commission proposed an 
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alternative dispute settlement mechanism intended to offer speedier problem-solving than the 
formal setting of cases before the CJEU could offer. When the internal market does not appear to 
function in practice:  
 
… speedy redress needs to be available. Resolving such practical problems is critical to the 
credibility of the Internal Market in the eyes of citizens and economic operators, particularly 
small and medium-sized businesses. We know from experience, however, that resolving 
problems can take a long time […] This prevents a lot of people from doing what they are 
entitled to by Community law. When this happens, confidence in the European Union is 
eroded.
46
 
 
These original aims and means still represent today the core idea of Solvit as a network. As a 
network, Solvit appeals directly to EU citizens and businesses, offering them fast, practical 
solutions to disputes over the application of internal market rules.
47
 All 27 Member States and 
Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland have established a Solvit centre, based within the national central 
administration, in most cases within the ministry of economic or foreign affairs.
48
  
 
The dispute settlement work-mode is quite unique. It is based on recurrent dialogues between 
citizens, companies, Solvit centres and the responsible national authorities. A complaint is first 
                                                 
46
 Ibid: 3 
47
 European Commission, ‘SOLVIT 2010 report: Development and performance of the SOLVIT network’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/docs/solvit_2010_report_en.pdf> accessed 3 September 2011, European Commission, 
‘About SOLVIT’ <http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm> accessed 3 September 2011 
48
 European Commission, ‘National Solvit Centres’ <http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/centres/index_en.htm> accessed 3 
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lodged to a ‘home’ centre; the centre with the same nationality as the complainer. If the home centre 
deems the case to be within the remit of the network and apparently involving a breach of EU 
legislation, the dispute is registered in the network and sent to the ‘lead’ centre. The ‘lead’ centre is 
located in the member state where the problem occurred. Should it accept the case, it subsequently 
initiates dialogue with the national public authority complained about.
49
 Within the Commission’s 
internal market Directorate General (DG), a Solvit unit is responsible for supporting the network, 
for example by assisting with the use of the case management database, engaging in dialogue with 
the centres on cases and organising events bringing all the actors together. The organisation and 
work process of the network can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 1: The organisation and work process of the Solvit network. Based on Commission 
illustration (COM 2011b) 
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Thus, problem-solving unfolds via several national and cross-national communication and 
justification processes whereby the application of supranational law is questioned and monitored 
primarily by national public administrations. The citizen or business needs to present and give 
reason to the ‘home’ Solvit centre, which again is to clarify, present and give reason on the disputed 
matter to the Solvit centre in the other member state: the ‘lead’ centre. The ‘lead’ Solvit centre must 
then present the subject matter and breaches of EU law to the responsible national authority in its 
own member state. Last, but certainly not least, the responsible national authority must give reason 
and justify its ways, which again is reviewed and eventually critiqued by the two Solvit centres. As 
an outcome of the dispute settlement process, the cross-border problem may be solved and 
misapplication turned into correct application. 
Since 2001, Solvit has been institutionalised around a set of main characteristics: 
Solvit cases have a ‘cross-border’ element, such as the sale of goods across internal EU borders or 
the use of social security by European migrant workers. They relate to practical application and not 
judicial implementation. A matter must concern a situation in which national legislation is deemed 
in line with the European obligation but the problem arises in the post-transposition phase.
50
 
Furthermore, as an alternative to time-consuming and costly legal processes, Solvit aims at speedy 
redress. A dispute should be solved within a maximum of ten weeks.
51
 Moreover, Solvit constitutes 
a network of informal problem-solving based on recurring dialogues addressing whether 
supranational law has been misapplied, questioned and monitored. Problems must be solved 
without legal proceedings. These characteristics make the Solvit network differ from traditional 
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enforcement mechanisms and makes it possible to extend research beyond the conventional focus 
within compliance studies on timely transposition of EU law. 
 
3.1.1 Becoming a successful dispute settlement mechanism 
 
Over the years, Solvit’s workload has increased significantly. Figure 2 below illustrates the major 
increase in the number of cases handled by the Solvit network. The statistics only include cases 
accepted by the network. Acceptance implies, as mentioned, that a submitted dispute has undergone 
‘pre-screening’, where the home Solvit centre has assessed the case and found it involves a cross-
border element, does not involve legislative changes, and agrees with the claimant that it appears 
likely that EU law has been misapplied.
52
 
 
Figure 2: Total Solvit caseload compared to infringement procedures 2002–2010.  
  
Figure 2: Solvit cases and infringement procedures compared 2002-2010. The data on infringement procedures 
are from the Commission’s Secretariat General’s annual reports on monitoring the application of Community 
law. The data on Solvit cases have been provided by the Commission. 
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A case accepted by the Solvit regime thus implies that the dispute is regarded as substantial. The 
network receives a considerable number of other requests which are not accepted as Solvit cases 
and thus not registered.  These include requests concerning purely national problems or require help 
and guidance on EU only.
53
 
In 2003, the network handled 154 cases; by 2010, the figure had grown to 1304. The 
request for and success of the informal dispute settlement mechanism stands out when comparing 
Solvit to the traditional formal EU public enforcement procedures. In comparison as part of the 
formal legal process of the infringement procedure, in 2010 the Commission sent 1,188 letters of 
formal notice to the Member States, issued 488 reasoned opinions and referred 120 cases to the 
CJEU in the same time period. Hence, compared to the much analyzed formal infringement 
procedure, the Solvit workload is considerable. 
 
3.2 The effectiveness of transgovernmental networks in dispute settlements and the role of the 
Commission 
 
From the case-load number itself, it is clear that misapplication cases are brought to Solvit to a 
considerable extent. Nevertheless, we should still expect – especially from an enforcement 
perspective – informal dispute resolution to be of limited utility, as national authorities are likely to 
hinder a dispute mechanism which does not operate by means of ‘command and control’. Here we 
examine effectiveness in accordance with our definition as the resolution speed of the network and 
the actual ability of the network to resolve cases.  
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The first proxy for estimating the effectiveness of the network thus concerns the case 
resolution speed. Is Solvit in practice an expeditious alternative to taking a matter to court? The 
official aim of the network is to solve cases within ten weeks. Since its establishment, this goal has 
overall been consistently met.
54
 However, the total time taken to process a claim from its 
submission is somewhat higher. This is due to the 10-week deadline only applies  from when a case 
has been accepted by a lead centre.
55
 The home centre’s preparation time and the time taken by the 
lead centre to consider whether to accept the case is therefore not included. In 2010, it took the 
centres on average five weeks to prepare a case; and one week to consider whether to accept a case 
from another centre.
56
 The total case processing time is therefore roughly 16 weeks, that is, 
approximately four months. This is still a short period of time compared with other formal 
enforcement mechanisms, both public and private, and the network stands out as efficient in terms 
of prompt dispute resolution. 
The second proxy for effectiveness is the ability of the network to resolve cases. Here, 
the Commission’s statistics again provide a picture of a highly successful system.57 The official aim 
of the network is a resolution rate of 80 per cent. This target has generally been  achieved from 
2002 onwards, although with some differences between the Member States. But what does it mean 
that a case is resolved? In its 2010 Annual Report, the Commission notes that in practice ‘resolved’ 
can, mean two different things: a changed decision or a clarification.
58
 The former entails that the 
initial administrative act is altered following the intervention of Solvit, namely that misapplication 
is transformed into correct application. The latter means that the claimant ultimately only receives 
                                                 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 European Commission (n 47). 
57
 European Commission (n 39). 
58
 European Commission (n 47). 
21 
 
additional information clarifying the background and reasons behind the decision, but the decision 
is not changed. Both outcomes are important as to how national administrations adapt to EU 
governance in the sense that they engage national public authorities and claimants in a mode of 
reasoning structured in EU legal terms.
59
 However, when the dispute is settled by means of a 
changed decision, this most directly substantiates the effectiveness and impact of the network, as it 
demonstrates the ability of the network to improve practical application.  
The Commission states that 23 per cent of all cases in 2010 ended with a clarification, 
meaning that the rest of the cases solved led to altered decisions.
60
 This suggests that the network is 
in fact able to generate alterations to decisions, that is, altering administrative acts. Figure 3 below 
shows the Solvit centres’ estimates of the proportion of their cases which ended in 2010 with a 
changed decision, as according to our own survey data: 
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Figure 3: The Solvit centre estimation of the proportion of cases in 2010 which ended with a 
change of the initial decision by the national public authority.  
 
We also asked the centres, as a control, to make a similar assessment of how many cases ended solely with a 
clarification. The answer to the two questions gave the same picture. Source: Solvit survey 2011, Question 10, ‘Of 
the Solvit cases handled as “lead” in 2010, what was the outcome?’ 
 
16 of the Solvit centres report that complaints end with a changed decision in about a half to all 
cases. Nine indicate that changes are less common. Five centres answered ‘do not know’ or left the 
question blank. The figure thus shows that the network is generally able to convince national public 
authorities to alter their practices. 
Figure 4 points out what the centre reports to be the preconditions for resolving cases: 
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Figure 4: The Solvit centres estimation of the preconditions for resolving cases.  
  
The categories strongly disagree/agree and agree/strongly disagree have been combined. ‘Do not know’ and 
missing answers have also been joined together. Source: Solvit survey 2011, Question 20, ‘To what extent, if at 
all, do you agree with the following statements concerning the preconditions for resolving cases?’ 
 
We asked the centres to assess the importance of four aspects: good working relations with other 
public authorities, ministerial support, legal case analysis and political contestation. No ranking was 
requested. The responses substantiate that all factors have some importance – but not equally so. 
There is a clear trend in what aspects the centres ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with as important. Good 
working relations with other parts of the national administration together with sound legal case 
analysis stand out as very important. Several centres also stress the necessity of ministerial and 
political backing. This element was particularly emphasised by one centre in a supplementary 
comment:  
 
…unfortunately we do not feel support for SOLVIT cases from our superiors, especially for 
citizen cases[.] This is due to the fact that SOLVIT [...] is established at the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade so the attention from our hierarchy concentrates a lot on business cases but 
24 
 
cases of ordinary citizens are not viewed that importantly. For example, social security cases 
which affect daily life and situations of European families […] [are] not seen as something 
significant and we are almost discouraged to talk about them/advertise them, etc.
61
  
 
The survey data thus highlight the importance of good working relations, legal analysis and to a 
large extent also ministerial backing. On the other hand, overall, the centres do not find the extent to 
which an issue is politicised of high importance.  
All in all, the official data presented by the Commission suggests that the network is 
an efficient problem-solving mechanism. Resolution speed is high compared to, for example, legal 
proceedings or formal infringement proceedings instigated by the Commission. Efficiency is also 
supported by the survey data collected for this analysis. Decentralised informal problem solving is, 
in fact, able to address gaps between the transposition and practical application of EU legislation. 
We do see some differences in outcomes in that the  end result may amount to  a change in a  
decision or solely a clarification. However, the vast majority of  Solvit cases lead to a change in the 
original  decisions and even in clarification cases, the work of the network promotes and 
strengthens the use of arguments framed in EU legal terms within national public authorities to 
justify the action they have taken.  
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3.2.1 The role of the Commission in informal dispute settlements 
Our survey data provides new insights into the role of the Commission. The survey points out that 
most national Solvit centres have contact with the EU Solvit unit, i.e. the Commission, on a regular 
basis. Some on an almost daily basis, others weekly, and others only a few times over the course of 
a month. In general, the European Commission is closely involved and consulted when the 
application of internal market rules is scrutinized:  
Twelve centres are in contact with the Commission weekly or more; 18 a few times 
over the course of a month or year. The level of contact is thus high although varying, 
substantiating the central role of the Commission in the network. The involvement of the 
Commission proves essential for different purposes. When asked about the purposes of the contact, 
three different ways of assisting the centres stand out as central: 
 
Figure 5: The purpose of the contact with the Commission.  
 
The respondents were invited to tick as many of the stated reasons as relevant. Source: Solvit survey 2011, 
Question 5, ‘What is the purpose of the contact with the European Commission?’ 
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The Commission assists the centres regarding the daily practices of the network.  This includes 
giving advice on  how to use the case management database, with understanding the legal content 
and meaning of EU law,  as well as assisting with the solution of horizontal disagreements with 
other Solvit centres. However, the Commission  does not appear to intervene very much when there 
are disagreements between Solvit centres and national public authorities within Member States. 
Thus, the Commission plays a role in the more technical matters of the network,. and assumes a 
supervisory role in the network being  continuously involved in the dispute settlements.  
Moreover, for most Solvit centres, contact with the Commission has increased over 
the years, as the responses to the question below demonstrate: 
 
Figure 6: Changes in the level of contact with the Commission.  
 
Source: Solvit survey 2011, Question 7, ‘Since your Solvit centre was established, the amount of contact with the 
European Commission has in general...?’ 
 
Nevertheless, the continuous and increasing involvement of the Commission in the dispute 
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the Commission and that of the national authority. In the survey we inquired into the degree to 
which the Commission’s view supersedes national views in the event of a  conflict between the two. 
The result was unequivocal. Where a conflict arises, the supranational hierarchy is clear. If the 
preferred case solution of the national public authority is in conflict with the recommendations 
made by the Commission, the Commission’s recommendations are followed:  
 
Figure 7: The Commission’s authority in the network.  
 
Source: Solvit Survey 2011, Question 17, ‘If the European Commission recommends a case solution different 
from the one preferred by your national public authority, what do you do?’ 
 
Thus, the Commission plays a central role in assisting and advising on dispute settlements. 
Although the process of resolution appears horizontally organized between three entities, namely 
the individual or firm with a complaint, the relevant Solvit centres and the national public authority 
against which a  complaint  has been made, the Commission (vertically) shadows the dispute and 
masters the database, assists on the clarification of EU law, and has a final say when conflicts 
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appear between national units. Although this form of alternative dispute settlement is not as 
coercive as traditional enforcement procedures, it operates in the shadow of supranational 
hierarchy.
62
 If a conflict is unsolved or the solution does not appear to follow EU  law, the 
Commission may decide to open an infringement procedure as the next step.
63
 Against this 
background, informal dispute settlement stands out as an attractive alternative. This may in part 
explain the success of the transgovernmental network as a dispute settlement mechanism. Although 
horizontal in structure, it has a vertical element of supranational supervision.  
 
Conclusion 
Our findings demonstrate that misapplication of EU law continues to occur on a regular basis even 
after the transposition of EU rules into national legislation. Despite considerable research being 
undertaken on the transposition of EU  law, this does not necessarily tell us much about compliance 
in practice. Citizens and enterprises encounter daily barriers to exercising their rights and 
complying with the obligations formally provided by internal market law. Correct practical 
application depends on the extent to which national public authorities at different governance levels 
understand and are willing to act in accordance with EU legislation, and not simply on transposition 
of the EU rules into national law.  
The findings of this empirical qualitative study demonstrate that the EU’s 
enforcement-management system has added an important de-centralized management dimension by 
means of transgovernmental networks. The findings thus point to transgovernmental networks such 
as Solvit as important and effective structure to address misapplication of EU law. The chapter has 
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thus contributed to fill in the black hole of developing a better understanding of EU law in action. 
Transgovernmental networks are effectively located in the core executives of the Member States, 
but reporting back to and taking advice from the Commission.
64
 The Commission has quietly and 
discreetly rearmed in its battle against misapplication of EU law relating to the functioning of the 
internal market by Member States by focusing on  compliance problems in the post-transposition 
stage. Alternative dispute settlement networks have developed and proven considerably  effective as 
a mechanism of de-centralized management practices  ensuring EU compliance. The informal 
dispute resolution provided by a TGN such as Solvit provides a strong, supplementary means of 
enforcing EU law along with the two traditional public and private enforcement mechanisms . 
Whilst  national courts are de-centralized private enforcement mechanisms,
65
 a transgovernmental 
network constitutes a de-centralized management mechanism which may be remarkably effective 
and successful in solving problems of misapplication. 
In part, this success is explained by the fact that national public authorities become 
supervisors of national compliance while operating close to the units under ‘surveillance’. The 
national Solvit centres are part of the national executives, located and financed there. At the same 
time, however, they are responsible for overseeing the conduct of their national counterparts; to 
question it, evaluate it, report on it and – eventually – take steps to ensure that it is in accordance 
with EU legislation. In this way, they become entrusted supervisors of EU  laws and key institutions 
in managing practical application, but in contrast to the national courts, do so in a manner more 
informed by trust, less by the threat of sanctions. They thus constitute an important part of the 
‘European executive space’, monitoring EU law but located in the national administrations.66    
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Although horizontal in structure and operating by means of management, the transgovernmental 
Solvit network has an important vertical dimension. The Commission occupies a central role in 
assisting and advising dispute settlements. The Commission’s involvement implies that, should the 
softer means of management not work, enforcement proceedings may be initiated. The continuous 
presence of the Commission means that supranational hierarchy shadows dispute resolution. In the 
shadow of supranational hierarchy, informal dispute settlements stand out as the attractive 
alternative. By creating a transgovernmental network of de-centralised supervision through national 
public authorities, the Commission has taken another important step in boosting the enforcement-
management machinery of the EU
67
, capable of detecting and resolving some of the disputes over 
the practical application of EU rule ‘below the tip of the non-compliance iceberg’.68  
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